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Why Are Wages Cyclical in the 1970s?
ABSTRACT
This paper investigates cyclicality in realwages between 1969 and 1982,
using 14 years of data from the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics. First, it
investigates the extent to which movements in and out of the labor market
created apparent wage cyclicality. Second, it investigates whethercyclical
movements of workers between heterogeneous wage sectors within the labormarket
created cyclicality. Little evidence of the first effect is found.The second
effect is much more important, and cyclicality clearlyoccurs in the movement
of workers between different labor market sectors.However, sector selection
is not correlated with wage determination. Thus, individualwage change
estimates of cyclicality need to control for sector location, but neednot
account for sector selection. The third conclusion of thepaper is that
cyclicality is present in real wages even within sectors over this timeperiod, and is the result of both cyclicality in overallwage levels (cyclicality in
the constant term in wage equations), as well as in the coefficientsassociated




Princeton, NJ 08544I. INTRODUTJON
The relationship between the business cycle andwages has been a much
discussed topic. Keynes suggested that realwages should be countercyclical,
since decreases in the realwage should induce increases in employment.
However, early empirical evidence found thataggregate wages moved procy-
clically (Dunlop [1938]). More recent empirical workutilized time series
analysis to suggest that aggregate realwages since the 1940s show little
evidence of any cyclicality (Neftci [1978],Sargent [1978], Altonji and
Ashenfelter [1980] or Geary and Kennan [1982]).However, the latest studies
have indicated that, at least in the decade of the1970s, aggregate wages
showed a clear procyclical pattern (Bils[1985], Blank [1985], Coleman [1984],
or Raisian [1983].) These later studies typicallyuse broader wage defini-
tions', which somewhat accounts for theirdivergent results. However, Coleman
repeats several earlier studies on equivalent data from the1970s and finds
evidence of procyclical wage movements. Thesemore recent studies also make a
point of using micro data. They uniformly conclude thatcyclical effects are
apparent in the micro data as well as in the aggregatewage data.
Given that predictions regardingwage cyclicality emerge from a wide
variety of economic models, it is important to understand thenature of the
apparent wage cyclicality that has been observed in recentyears. This paper
further investigates cyclicality in realwages between 1969 and 1982, focussing
on two issues. First, changes In the composition of the laborforce over the
cycle can create cyclical wage changes. Thispaper investigates cyclical
changes in worker selection in and out of the labor marketas well as in
movements between heterogeneous labor market sectors. Aswe shall see below,
if such selection issues are not explicitly addressedempirically, then even
micro data estimates of wage changesmay exhibit spurious wage cyclicality.
While I find little evidence of significant selectionin and out of the labor
1market (at least among white men), thereis clear evidence that aggregate wage
estimates are affected by cyclicalworker movements between heterogeneous
sectors; but because there islittle correlation between sectoral choice and
wage determination, microdata estimates are not affected by these movements.
Second, once compositional labor market changes areaccounted for, there
are two ways by which individual wage changes maybe associated with changes in
macroeconomic activity. There may be a directrelationship to overall wage
levels, manifest by cyclicality in theconstant of the wage equation over time,
which can be measured by including a cyclicalvariable in a wage change
equation. This is the approachtaken by all existing research. Alternatively,
this paper also explores the possibilitythat there may be cyclical changes in
the entire wage/skill relationship (cyclicalityin the coefficients determining
the return to individual skill characteristics.)This paper finds significant
evidence that both types of cyclicality haveoccured in recent years.
II. MODELLING THE CYCLICALITY IN AGGREGATEWAGESIN A HOMOGENEOUS LABORMARKET
The basic labor market model used in this paperis the classic human
capital wage equation for individual iin year t,
(1) wit =ln(W±t)
= +Xt + u + Ejt,
where W represents the wage rate, X is a vectorof individual characteristics
which affect productivity and hence determine wages,'r is a vector of related
coefficients, which represents the weightsthese characteristics are given in
the wage determination process, u is the cyclicaleffect on individual i's
wage, and s is a random errorterm. The X's often include additionalvariables
which are institutionally important in the labormarket, although they may or
may not have direct productivity impacts(such as union status or region.)2
Define the cyclical effect as
u =f(Xt)ut,wheref(Xjt) = +Xit6.
2Ut is the pure cyclical effect, while f(Xt) is the effect associated with the
characteristics vector X. (1) can be rewritten as
(2) Wit ( + &0Ut) + Xit(t + &ut) + it
=B0t+ Xt13t + it•
If wages are determined homogeneously throughout the labormarket, differing
only across the variables included in the vector X, thenequation (2) represents
the wage determination process forany individual i.
Let Wt represent the mean wage in period t, calculatedfrom among all
labor force participants, with X being the vector ofmean characteristics for




-ot)+ Xt(13t÷1 -13t+ (Xt+i -Xt)13t÷1
The three terms on the right hand side ofequation (3) decompose the change in
aggregate mean wages into three parts: a homogeneous time-varying effect which
occurs for all demographic groups; changes in thewage coefficients which
differ across demographic groups; and aggregationeffects, resulting from
changes in the means of the X's.
The third term will be nonzero when there isselectivity in the workers
who move in and out of the labor force over the cycle. Forinstance, assume
period t represents a recession period and period t+l a boomperiod. If
additional workers are attracted into the labor market in boomperiods who have
lower average skills than the mean worker in a recessionperiod, then this
implies that ￿ X. for all elements of the vector X.3 In thiscase, the
third term on the right hand side of (3) is clearlynegative, and is a measure
of the aggregation bias. If the 13's are procyclical(13t÷l > 13) then measured
cyclicality in aggregate wages will understate the true cyclicality in in-
dividual wages. In fact, depending on the relative size of thesethree terms,
it is possible that aggregate wages could evenappear to be countercyclical.
3That research which investigates cyclicalityin aggregate wage data obviously
suffers from an inability to separate aggregationbias effects from true
cyclical effects.
In contrast, the micro data research citedabove typically estimates
individual wage change equations, including changes inthe unemployment rate as
one of the independent variables.The sign and significance on the change in
unemployment is taken as a measure of the cyclicalityimbedded in wages. Note
that there are two problems with this approach. First,these equations can
typically be estimated only from data onthose persons who are stably employed
over several time periods. As Moffitt,Keane and Runkle [1987] note, focusing
only on workers who do not leave the labormarket does not guarantee unbiased
estimates of wage cyclicality. Assume we can characterizethe decision to
participate in the labor market as
*
(4)P it =Zjwt+u,
where P is a measure of the utility comparisonbetween labor market
participation and nonparticipation forindividual i, Z is a vector of individual
characteristics, ¶1 is a related coefficient vector,and u is a random error
term. If the error term in (2) is correlatedwith u, the error in (4), then
estimating (2) (or some transformation of itsuch as individual wage changes)
will result in biased estimates of theJ3t•4 Thus, in order to accurately
estimate the true 13's (and their underlying cyclicality), onemust empirically
account for labor market participation choicesmade by workers.
Second, the inclusion of a simple change in unemploymentrates in an
individual wage change equation essentially measures onlythe cyclicality in the
first term of equation (3) (by parameterizing it as a changein unemployment
rates), and ignores the second term, whichallows for changes over time in the
determinants of wages. There are good theoretical reasonsto expect that
macroeconomic cycles will have different impacts onworkers with different
4labor market characteristics. In a world where both capital and laborare
completely replicable in the short run and where there are no economies or
diseconomies of scale in the production process,wage determination should
remain unaffected by levels of production. If demand doubles, the firmcan
immediately duplicate its production process and double its output withno
change in the nature of production. However, if these conditions are notmet,
then the nature of the production process itself willchange as activity levels
vary. This can readily affect the value of worker skills to the firm, changing
the wage/skill relationship which human capital models describe.
If capital is not immediately replicable in the shortrun, any attempt to
increase production in response to rising demand will requiremore intensive
utilization of existing capital. Multiple shifts or speeded—upproduction
lines are common in times of high economic growth. Thesechanges might
increase the value of coordinational activities within the firm, thusincreasing
the value of formal training and/or management experience. For workerson the
production line, if the increase in production is accomplished by a greater
division of labor, job de-skilling could occur as workers are givenmore
limited tasks. Formal training, or job experience could become lessimportant
to the firm. Alternatively, if equivalent additional labor is not availableto
the firm, the value of experience and training could increase,as attempts are
made to increase the productivity level of the existing work force.
Realize that this analysis assumes that wages reflect the current product-
ive value of the worker to the firm. A variety of institutionalarrangements
might prevent changes in the value of the worker to the firm from being
translated into immediate wage changes. The effect of worker/firmwage
contracts -- bothexplicit and implicit -- hasbeen much explored in the
literature. There may clearly exist incentives for both workers and firms to
provide "wage smoothing" of some nature, breaking the link between point-in-
5-time wages and the marginal product ofthe worker. In this case, wage levels
and their determinants will vary less overthe cycle, although in many models
the decrease in wage variation over the cycleis offset by an increase in
employment variability. Thus, the greaterthe extent of wage smoothing in the
labor market, the more one would expect tofind aggregate wages affected
primarily by changes in labor market participationand composition.5
However, if wage smoothing is not complete,or if it is not available in
certain sectors of the labor market, one mightfind changes over the cycle in
the estimated coefficients of the entire wage equation.This effect can be
modelled by allowing the vector 13 to vary overtime.
III. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON WAGE CYCLICALITYIN A HOMOGENEOUS LABOR MARKET
This section will present evidence on the componentsof aggregate wage
cyclicality. I will also provideevidence on the extent to which accounting for
labor market participation decisions changesestimates of wage cyclicality.
Throughout this section, I assume that a single wageequation adequately
characterizes the entire labor market, an assumptionwhich will be dropped in
the next section when I investigate the effectof sectoral heterogeneity on
wage cyclicality.
SOME COMMENTS ON DATA
This study uses the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics(PSID) from the 14
years 1969 through 1982. Inthis initial set of results I do not make use of
the longitudinal nature of this data set, but useit as a series of consecutive
cross sections. While it might at first appeardesirable to estimate cyclical-
ity from individual wage change equations,this creates potential problems.
am interested in describing the sourcesof recent aggregate wage cyclicality.
As noted above, individual wage change equationsnecessarily focus only on
those individuals who remain in the labor marketfor several consecutive years.
For persons who enter or leave the labor market, orwho are unemployed for long
6periods of time, Continuous wage observations are not available.Omitting
these people from the sample may eliminate the mostlikely sources of aggregate
cyclicality. Similarly, as we shall discuss below, workers who switchjobs
between heterogeneous sectors may experience changes intheir whole wage
determination process, a difficult process to model at theindividual level if
there are different wage/skill regimes in differentsectors. As a result of
these problems, I take a different approach in the estimatesbelow, which
provides consistent estimation of the effects I seek to explore, butwhich may
not always be fully efficient since it ignores some of thecross-time informa-
tion available on those individuals who remain in the labormarket for multiple
periods.
I initially treat the PSID as a series of 14sequential cross-sections. I
utilize the data for all male household heads in eachdesignated year between
the ages of 20 and 65 who report labor marketearnings. I use the entire PSID
sample to create these yearly data sets, which is composed of a randomsample
and a low-income sample. (I make separate estimates forblack and white men;
without using the low-income sample, I would not haveenough observations on
black men to be able to investigate themseparately.) As a result, sample
weights must be used to weight my sample back to a random sample. Theseare
provided within the PSID. All numbers and estimates reported hereare based on
weighted data. These weights change over time as the demographics of thePSID
sample and the demographics of the country change.6
Wages are defined as average hourly earnings, calculated bydividing total
labor market income over the year by total hours of work. Asa result, they
include overtime and second-job income.7 Allwage data is transformed to 1981
dollars. Note that by using a measure ofwages based on annual earnings, I
thus include in my sample of employed workersany individuals who had some labor
7income over the year. This shoulddecrease the effect of changes in labor
market participation on labor forcecomposition.8
EtIPIRICAL RESULTS
Using the 14 cross-sectionsdescribed above, I estimate 14 separate OLS
wage equations for white menand for black men. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1
describe the data used in these estimations.At the top of Table 1 is summary
information on the dependent variable, averagehourly earnings. Row 1 shows
the mean wage in 1981 dollars duringthese 14 years, calculated as the average
of the 14 mean wage variables fromeach sample. For white men, the average
wage level is $10.70,with a mean annual change of$.04/year.9 To estimate
aggregate wage cyclicality, I use
the mean wage rates from each of the 14 years
to estimate the 13-observation regression
(5) Wager -Wage_1=+ ai((GNPt
-GNPt_i)/GNPt_l)+
Thecoefficient a1 indicates the change in wagerates induced by a 1% increase
in GNP.1° For both white and black men,significant evidence of cyclicality in
aggregate wages is apparent: A1% increase in GNP increases whitemen's wages
by slightly more than $.04/hour,and increases black men's wages by almost
$.06/hour.
The variables which compose the X vectorin the estimated wage equations
are also described in Table 1.For each variable, I indicate their mean level
across all individuals and all years.I also estimate cyclicality in these
means over the 14 years of data byrunning a regression similar to (5). Thus,
for education, this is the regression
(6) Educt -Educt_i
=a0+ ai((GNPt -GNP..)/GNP1)+
Theresulting a1 coefficients are reportedbelow the means for each variable.
Within this aggregate data there is noevidence of cyclicality in any of
the means of these variables, for eitherwhite or black men. Thus, there is
little support for the hypothesis thatmuch of the cyclicality in aggregate
8wages can be explained by workers with different skill characteristics moving
in and out of the labor market. The results in Table 1 indicate that changes
in mean worker characteristics show virtually no cyclicalityover time.11
The coefficients resulting from the 14 OLSwage equations are presented in
columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.12i have 14 estimates of each coefficient. The
mean of these 14 estimates is presented first, followed by the mean of their
standard errors.I also report the standard deviation of the coefficientsover
the 14 years, which provides a comparison of theaverage variation in the
estimates across the years to the average within-year standarderrors. There
is clearly some significant variation in the coefficient estimatesover the
years --thecross-year standard deviation is typically higher than the mean
within-year standard error for all the coefficients.
The cyclical patterns in these coefficients are estimated byregressing
the change in these coefficients against the percent change inGNP, similar to
equations (5) and (6) above.13 The estimated relationship between percent
growth in GNP and the change in the coefficients over time is shown in the
fourth row for each variable. The earlier discussion noted both thepossibility
of overall shifts in the wage level (cyclicality in the constant) as wellas
cyclicality in the other wage determinants. The results in Table 2 demonstrate
both effects. While there is evidence of procyclicality in the constant for
white men (a homogeneous upward shift in wage levels as theeconomy expands),
there is also evidence that an increase in macroeconomic activity increases the
effect of age and age squared (a proxy for experience) in determiningwages.
The coefficients on education and union status show little evidence of cyclical-
ity. For black men only the education coefficient shows mildly procyclical
effects.
The implication of these results is that most of the cyclicality in
aggregate wages appears to be explained by shifts in the constant and the
9coefficients of the wage equation,with little effect of aggregation bias due to
changes in the characteristicsof workers over the cycle. To further testthis
proposition, I estimate a setof wage equations for each year with anadditional
term included to adjust for selectivityin and out of the labor force. This is
a standard econometric technique,first developed by Heckman [1974]. Briefly,
a probit equation (as specifiedin (4)), representing the probability oflabor
market participation is initiallyestimated using all data, from both workers
and nonworkers. The results of this probitare used to calculate a selection
correctivity term, \t which isincluded in the wage equation, and corrects the
error term for any correlationbetween the probability of participationand the
wagelevel)4 The means of the 14 coefficients which resultfrom the select-
ivity-corrected wage estimates, and
their mean standard errors, as well as the
standard errors of the coefficients overthe 14 years are given in columns 3
and 4 of Table 2.It is clear that the none of the coefficientsfor either
white or black men change in any significant wayas a result of this selectivity
correction. The reason for this is apparentat the bottom of Table 2, where
the coefficients on the selectivity terms arepresented. In only two of the 14
regressions for white men is thiscoefficient significant. It is also clear
that there is no significant cyclicalityin the coefficient. Thus, for white
males, there is no evidence in thisdata that cyclical movements in and out of
the labor market affect aggregate wage cyclicality.This picture is slightly
less clear for black men. In 6 of the 14 regressionS,there is significance on
the selectivity term. (The mean coefficientand mean standard error indicate
insignificance, but the variance in thecoefficients over the years is large.)
This indicates that there is some effect on wagesdue to the selectivity of who
moves in and out of the labor market amongblack men. However, the regression
coefficient relating changes in GNP to changesin the estimated selectivity
coefficients indicates that there is no cyclicalityin these coefficients.
10I am not the first to research this issue, Moffitt, Keaneand Runkle
[1987] investigate the effects of selectivity into the labormarket, using
several relatively complex models of individualwage changes, corrected for
selectivity bias. In contrast to my results, they do find thiscorrection
makes a difference --infact, worker movements in and out of the labor market
appear to increase the procyclicality in aggregate wage measures. Thereare at
least two reasons why these results differ from mine.First, they use a
different data set, with observations only onyoung men, a group which may be
more prone to labor force participation changes. Second, they havepoint-in-
time estimates of wages and labor market participation, ratherthan the
annualized measure available in my data set.15 As notedabove, one would
expect reater compositional changes with higher-frequency data.However, even
after these selectivity effects are accounted for,they find evidence of
further wage cyclicality, similar to the resultspresented here.
The conclusion is that there are no clear cyclical shifts inworker
characteristics over time in this data, and thus little evidenceof aggregation
bias due to changes in the skill levels of labor marketparticipants. Given no
evidence of correlation between labor force participation andwages, especially
for white men, micro data estimating procedures whichignore this issue should
provide consistent estimates of wage cyclicality.
IV. HETEROGENEITY IN TIlEWAGE/SKILL RELATIONSHIP BENEEN SECTORS
Although there is little evidence of aggregation bias in this data induced
by labor market participation changes, there is anotherway in which labor
market composition may change over the cycle. Untilnow I haveassumed that
therelationship between wages and worker skills is the same for all workers at
a point in time. However, if wage determination is heterogeneousacross
different sectors of the labor market, and if workersmove between these
sectors in a cyclical manner, then apparent cyclicality in the determinantsof
11wages may be due to changesin sectoral composition. To see this, assumethat
the labor market is composed of two typesof jobs, each of which utilize worker
skills differently. Call these manufacturingand non-manufacturing jobs. For
any worker I in amanufacturing job in time t, the wage/skillrelationship is
(7) Wmit =XmitBrnt+ Emits
while for any nonmanufacturing worker jthe relationship is
(8) wt =XtBt
+
Because of the difference In the natureof the jobs, one expects that mean
worker characteristics will vary betweenthese sectors as workers choose the
sector which best repays their setof skills. What happens if this heterogene-
ity is ignored, and one estimatesa single wage equation acrossall workers,
calculating a single t? It can beshown that the resulting estimate of




and Xj represents the mean vector ofcharacteristics in sector j at time t.
That is, the 3t estimated from thecombined sample is a weighted combination of
the underlying "true" coefficients,
where the weights are determined by the
variance of the respective X's. In asimilar manner,
(10) t+1 =9mt+lBmt+1+
Let 6mt 'mt1mt + and 6nt =nt/mt+ -
whilemt+1 =nmt+i/(nmt+1+ t+i and &nt+1 =1-6mt+1The change in







12In this situation changes in the aggregate 13's canno longer be interpret-
ed as "pure" cyclical effects. 13t and13t have become implicated in the
aggregation bias. Part of their observed cyclicalitymay be due to cyclical
changes in 13m and I3 but part may also be due to cyclicalchanges in the
weights, em and en. In fact, in the absence of any cyclicality in theunderly-
ing coefficients mt =13mt+land 13nt =13nt+1)'there may still be cyclicality
in the aggregate coefficients, I3 and as em and 0n change over time. The
primary implication of this section is that if there is heterogeneity in the
wage/skill determination process across sectors and if the mix of workers
between sectors changes over the cycle, it will be almostimpossible to
separate out the effects of aggregation bias from the effects of truecyclical-
ity, unless one can clearly identify and estimate separatewage functions for
each heterogeneous group. Even micro data studies which estimateindividual
wage change equations may be affected by this problem. If job shifts between
sectors are not explicitly accounted for in the estimation, thencyclical
variables (such as the unemployment rate)may pick up the effects of these
omitted variables, reflecting cyclical shifts betweenwage regimes on the part
of individual workers, rather than actual cyclicality inwage rates.
IV. EMPIRICALEVIDENCEONLABORMARKETHETEROGENEITY AN])CYCLICALITY
As an initial exploration of the possibility of sectoralheterogeneity in
the labor market, I estimate OLS wage equations for three differentcategories
of workers from each successive cross-section of workers. Because ofmy concern
regarding aggregation of workers whose wage/skill relationshipmay vary I
separate all professional, managerial, and administrative employees (hereafter
referred to as PMA workers) and estimate awage equation for them. With the
remaining non-PMA workers, I create two groups, one composed of all workers in
manufacturing industries, and the other composed of non-manufacturing employ-
ees.'7 Separatewage regressions provide 14 annual observations on each
13coefficient for each group. The means of the data (over all individuals and
all years) in each of the groups are shown in Table 1, columns 3 through 5 for
white men and columns 6 through 8 for black men.
As Table 1 indicates, PMA workers have much higher average hourly earnings,
than do other workers, but there is no sign of cyclicality in their wages.
However, both manufacturing and non-manufacturing wages show significant
cyclicality among both white and black men. Although there is no cyclicality
in their aggregate wages, PNA workers appear to have procyclical education
levels and mild countercyclicality in unionization rates (which are low among
these workers). Ilanufacturing workers show evidence of procyclicality in
education levels, and non-manufacturing workers show evidence of procyclicality
in age and age squared. Given previous evidence that significant shifts in and
out of the labor force do not occur, these results are consistent with a story
in which the manufacturing sector in boom times attracts and/or keeps workers
with more education than the typical manufacturing worker, but less education
than the average PMA worker, raising educational levels in both sectors. From
the nonmanufacturing sector, manufacturing attracts and/or keeps workers who
match the average age in that sector, but who in low-growth times move into the
nonmanufacturing sector, lowering average age in that sector. Thus, while the
aggregate measures of worker characteristics in columns 1 and 2 indicated
little shift over time, disaggregation into sectors indicates that workers
appear to be moving between sectors over the cycle in such a waythat the
characteristics of the mean worker in each sector changes with macroeconomic
activity.
The coefficients from the wage regressions for each of these three groups
are presented in Table 3. Table 3 is essentially the sector-specific analogue
of Table 2, which estimated a single wage equation for all workers. As Table 3
indicates, there are significant differences in the wage/skill determination
14process among workers in each of these three labor market groups.1-8 For
instance, the return to education among black PHA workers isvery high (perhaps
indicating a scarcity of educated black men.) The return to experience (here
proxied by age19) is highest in manufacturing for blacks and in PHA jobs for
whites. Unionization clearly has the strongest impacton nonmanufacturing wages
for both black and white workers.
Table 3 also investigates the cyclical pattern in these coefficients.
Among white men, the coefficient on education shows procyclical effects
(greater returns to education in boom times) in manufacturing. In nonmanufac-
turing, returns to age are procyclical and the union coefficient is counter-
cyclical. Surprisingly, the constant is significantly countercyclical for both
manufacturing and nonmanufacturing workers among whites. Thus, although
aggregate wage patterns are procyclical, there is a countercyclical homogeneous
effect on wages in these two sectors, which is then offset by othercyclical
effects. Among black men, there is less evidence of cyclicalityon these
coefficients. In short, compared to Table 2, when wages are estimated
separately by sector, many new cyclical patterns in the coefficientsemerge.
The differences in wage coefficient estimates between the three labor
market groups, the cyclicality in the means of worker characteristics within
the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors, and the differences in the
cyclical patterns of wage determinants between Tables 2 and 3 indicates there
are changes in the sectoral composition of the labor force over the cycle. If
wages are correlated with sectoral choice, estimating wage equations without
accounting for the sectoral choice process may result in biased coefficient
estimates, and apparent cyclicality in wage determinants may merely reflect
cyclicality in sectoral movements as discussed above.
Of the studies cited earlier which present evidence ofwage cyclicality
over the l970s, few deal with the problem of heterogeneouswage determination
15between sectors. Bus explicitly considers the role of jobswitches in wage
changes and concludes that virtually all of the cyclicalityin his estimates is
coming from individuals who change jobs betweentime periods. Moffitt, Keane
and Runkle estimate a limited selection model among manufacturingworkers and
find evidence of selectivity effects. To fully explore this issue,I implement
a joint estimation procedure of a three-waysectoral choice model and three
simultaneous sectoral wage equations.2°
Assume that workers choose between three labor market possibilities:
employment as a PMA worker, or work in the manufacturing ornonmanufacturing
sector. Designate these three labor market groups as P. N,and N. Observing a
worker in sector P is equivalent to knowing that sector P is preferredto N and
that P is preferred to N. If wage levels are correlated withsectoral choice,
then one wants to estimate wages for PMA workers jointly accountingfor the two
sectoral preferences they have demonstrated.
Let the utility gained by a worker in sector j be denoted Uj.Then
preferences among three sectors can be completelycharacterized by three equa-










=Z62+ '2 (determines the selection of M over N);
(14) U*PM =U
-
UNZ63 +p.,(determines the selection of P over N).
Note that the third preference equation is completely determined bythe first
two. In other words, U*pN =U*PN
-U*.2lWhile we clearly do not observe the
value of U in any situation, we do observe whether or not a particularsector
has been chosen. Thus, choice of the sector P is assumed to implythat upN >
oand U*PM >0.Choice of sector N implies that U* >0and *p ￿ 0. Choice
of sector N implies that U' <0and U*pN <0.
Because wage determination is assumed to differ between theselabor market
groups, there are three possible wage regimes anindividual can enter:
16(15) W=XB+
(16) WM=Xf3M+M
(17) WN = +
Ifthere is a correlation between sector selection andwage levels, then
estimating equations (15) -(17)alone will produce biased estimates of the 13
coefficients, since the expected value of the 's will be correlatedwith the
p's and hence will not equal zero. To correct for thisintercorrelation, one
must estimate the wage equations jointly with the sector selectionequations.
For any individual i, the likelihood that he or she is observedin sector
P earning W1,, can be written as
(18) Pr( p (Wp -X1Bp)/p, > Z&1,3i >Z63).
Thelikelihood of earning a wage in sector £1 is
(19) Pr( M =(WMj
-
XfI3M)/aM2i >-Z162,i31￿-Z63 ),
whilethe likelihood of earning a wage in sector N is
(20) Pr( tN =(WNI
-XjBN)/Nli 2i -Z162 ).
Assumingthat the 's and p's are jointly normally distributed,Appendix 1
provides the statistical details as to how these 3-element probability functjons
can be written in terms of univarjate and bivariate conditional normal func-
tions. Estimation of the resulting likelihood functionacross all individuals
(equation A9 in Appendix 1) will provide estimates of the three vectors ofwage
coefficients (13p, 6M' and 6N)' the standard errors of these threewage equations
°M' and c5N), two vectors of sectoral choice coefficients ('l and 62, from
which 63 can be derived), and 5 correlation coefficients(p12, the correlation
between p1 and p2; r1EP, the correlation betweenp1 and c; rlN, the correla-
tion between l and F2€M, the correlation between p2 and and r2CN, the
correlation between p2 and from these r3 and r3M can be derived; r1 =
r2=r3N=0.)Significant parameter estimates of these correlation
coefficients would indicate that the sectoral choice and sectoralwage equations
17are correlated and must be jointly estimatedto produce unbiased estimates of
the 13's.
The results of estimating this joint sectoral choice/wage modelfor white
men on each of the 14 years are presented inTable 4. As before, I show the
mean of the 14 estimated coeffients and theirstandard errors, as well as the
standard deviation of the coefficients over the 14 years, and the regression
coefficient that correlates changes in these coefficients to changes toGNP.
The coefficients on the sectoral choice equations are consistentwith what one
might expect. Less educated and older men are more likelyto be manufacturing
workers than nonmanufacturing workers, and are also more likely tobe non-
manufacturing than PMA workers. Manufacturing jobs are less likelyto be
located in the south or the west.
There is little evidence of cyclicality in the determinants of choice
between the PNA and manufacturing sectors. However, countercyclicalityin both
age coefficients in the choice of manufacturing overnonmanufacturing implies
that more young workers move into or remain employed in manufacturing inboom
times. Procyclicality in the constant in the choice manufacturing over
nonmanufacturing and countercyclicality in the constant of PMA overmanufactur-
ing implies that the manufacturing sector draws workers awayfrom both other
sectors in boom times.
Comparing the wage coefficients in Table 4, with joint wage/sectoral
choice estimation, to those in Table 3, where each sector's wage is independent-
ly estimated, there are few differences. Not only are estimatedvalues
similar, but so are the patterns of cyclicality. In nonmanufacturing,there is
cyclicality in the coefficients on age, union status and the constant;in
manufacturing there is mild cyclicality on the education coefficient,while PHA
workers show little evidence of any cyclical effects.
18The reason for this similarity is clear at thebottom of Table 4, where the
mean estimates of the correlation coefficientsresulting from this joint
estimating procedure are presented. These are uniformly smalland insig-
nificant, and none of them demonstrateany cyclical effects. (In no equation
for any year do any of the estimated correlationcoefficients show signifi-
cance.) This indicates that there is no correlation betweenthe errors in the
wage equations and the errors in the sectoral choiceequations, which means that
sectoral choice, although cyclically affected, neednot be accounted for in
order to derived unbiased estimates of thewage determinants in each sector.
This implies that estimated cyclicality in thewage coefficients in manufactur-
ing and nonmanufacturing shown in Table 3 reflect actualchanges in the wage
determination process over the cycle in thesesectors, and are not contaminated
by sector selection.
The results in Table 4 indicate thatsome sector-specific cyclicality
occurs due to movements between sectors (as shown bycyclicality in worker
characteristics in manufacturing andnonmanufacturing), while some of it occurs
because of actual cyclical changes in the determinantsof wages within each
sector. To further explore the issue of movement betweensectors, I investigate
both the nature of cross-sectoral movementsover these 14 years, as well as the
extent to which wage cyclicality occursamong those who do not change sectors.
Using the longitudinal nature of the PSID, I construct 13samples, each a
two-year matched sample containing two years of informationon all male
household heads who participated in the labor marketfor both years. Thus the
first sample contains all male heads who work in both1969 and 1970, while the
last sample is composed of all male heads who workin both 1981 and 1982. With
these two-year samples I can comparewage changes and labor market movements
across each two year period using data from the same individuals.
19There are six possible inter-sectoral moves that a worker canmake between
years. These are listed atthe top of Table 5. Using the two-year matched
samples I derive 13 observations on the percentof workers who make each type of
sectoral move in each two-year period. As Table 5 indicates,the largest flows
are clearly in and out of the non-manufacturingsector --onaverage 4.9% of
all workers move into this sector each year (2.9% from PMA jobsand 2.1% from
manufacturing jobs), and 5.6% of all workers leave it forwork in another
sector. The ratio of intersectoral movers to total workersin each two year
period is regressed against the percent changein GNP over these years, and the
results are shown in the second row of Table 5. Significant cyclicalityis
evident, as more workers leave nonmanufacturingand move into manufacturing
when the economy expands, while fewer workers move intoPMA jobs during an
expansion, being more content to stay in manufacturing orin nonmanufacturing.
Yet, while movements between sectors are cyclical,there is little
cyclicality in the number of people who remain ineach sector over each two
year period. The bottom of Table5 uses the two-year matched samples to look
at workers who stay in each sector for both years. On average,30.2% of all
workers stay in PMA jobs, 17.6% stay in manufacturing, while40% remain in non-
manufacturing. There is no cyclicality in these numbers. Although more people
leave nonmanufacturing to move into manufacturing during boom times,fewer of
them leave to move into PNA work, thus leaving about the same percentageof
tstayers in non-manufacturing. Examination of the other sectorsreveals
similar offsetting patterns. The cyclical movements between sectorsdoes not
change the percent remaining in a given sector.
Average wage changes over each two-year period for moversand stayers are
also shown in Table 5. There is clearly a great deal of variationin the wage
changes different individual experience as they movebetween sectors, as
evidenced by the large average standard deviations. However,there is no
20evidence of cyclicality in these wage changes. Incontrast, among the stayers
in a sector, while PMA workers show no cyclicality in theirwage changes across
years, both manufacturing and non-manufacturing workers exhibitstrong procyc-
licality in wages. Realize the implication of this result: individualwage
changes among workers who remain stably employed within themanufacturing and
nonmanufacturing sector show cyclical patterns. Since there can beno issue of
aggregation bias or compositional change among these workers, this isperhaps
Pt thestrongest possible evidence of real wage cyclicality over decade.
VI. SUMMARY
Aggregate wages are clearly cyclical during the 14year period investigated
in this study. Little of this cyclicality at theaggregate level appears to be
related-to selective movements of workers in and out of the labormarket; in
fact, there is no evidence here that any correlation between labor force
participation and wage levels occurs for white men, once education,age and
union status are accounted for. However, cyclicality in thedeterminants of
wages is apparent; there is procyclicality in both the constant (a homogeneous
shift in wages with business activity) and in theweighting on age, which means
that older and more experienced workers have awage advantage in boom times.
However, these aggregate estimates assume a homogeneous labor market.
There is significant evidence that wages areseparately determined for at least
three groups: professional, managerial and administrativeworkers, and all
other workers in manufacturing and in nonmanufacturing.Significant movement
in the work force occurs between these sectors over thecycle. In particular,
more workers either move into or stay in manufacturing, or stay in nonmanufac-
turing. This shift is strongest among younger workers, so that theaverage age
of workers in manufacturing drops in boom times. However, there isno correla-
tion between these sectoral movements and sector-specificwage levels, once a
standard set of worker characteristics are accounted for. Thus, micro-data
21studies of wage changes should control for sectorlocation, but can ignore
sector selectivity and still produceunbiased estimates of cyclical effects.
In addition to cyclicality in cross-sector movements amongworkers with
different skill characteristics, there is also cyclicalityin wage determinants
within sectors over these years. Both manufacturingand nonmanufacturing
workers show homogeneous countercyclical changesin wage levels (countercyc-
licality in the constant.) This is offset byother procyclical effects.
Nanufacturing workers experience an increase inthe coefficient on education
over the cycle. Nonmanufacturing workersreceive more repayment for experience
in boom times, and less repayment to unionization.PNA workers experience no
cyclicality in their aggregate wages, andthis is reflected in a lack of
cyclicality in any of their wage coefficients.This group is thus largely
unaffected by business cycles.In short, both cyclical changes in the
constant as well as changes in the weighting onskill characteristics occurs
over the cycle, so that even workerswho remain stably employed within a given
sector evince wage cyclicality if they are notin PMA jobs.
The results of this study raise a variety of issueswhich deserve further
investigation. First, given that aggregate wages priorto the 1970s showed
little cyclicality, it would be interesting to comparethe labor market in the
l970s to an earlier time period and investigate whathas changed. Second, the
nature and effect of individual job changes hasbeen little studied in the
literature. More careful micro-data analysis of this issuewould add to our
understanding of the sectoral labor market movementsnoted here. Third, while
this paper provides evidence that the wage determination processchanges over
the cycle, a better understanding of how production and hiring processes
actually vary over the cycle, would be useful to provide somecausal understand-
ing of the empirical results reported here.
221. Earlier studies looked only at manufacturingwages. More recent work uses
aggregate wages from the entire labor market. In addition,wage definitions in
these newer studies often include overtimepay, second job income, and other
more cyclical components.
2.There are more complex (and probably more realistic)ways of modeling the
relationship between wages and worker skills. See, for instance, Heckman and
Sedlacek [1985]. Unfortunately, the data we typically haveavailable contains
only rather gross measures of worker skills, such as educationlevel, age or
experience. It is certainly possible to view the standardwage-estimating
equation in (1) as a reduced form of a more complex relationship betweenworker
skills, job requirements and wages. In this case, the t's stillprovide a
translation of worker skills into wage levels, but a causalinterpretation of
the process by which r is determinedmay be less clear.
3. In this example I assume that it is less skilled workerswho leave the labor
market during recessions, but this is not clear a pori. Moreskilled workers
may have higher reservation wages, or a higher value of non-market time, and
thus may remain out of the labor market longer onceunemployed.
4. This is a straightforward conclusion from thesample selectivity literature.
See Heckman [1974].
5. See Abowd and Card [l987J for empirical evidenceon the extent of wage
smoothing.
6. The PSID follows everyone from the original sample and addsin all new
individuals who join the households of an existing sample member.Thus, the
size of the PSID is steadily increasing over time asnew children and spouses
appear. Existing PSID individuals also enter my cross-sections as theyage and
become household heads. The white male sample increases from 1657to 2641
during these 14 years, and the black male sample increases from 694 to 1297.
7. As others have noted, this type of wage definitioncan be subject to serious
errors. It would be preferable to have actual reportedwage rates, but this is
not available for all workers within the PSID. To the extent thaterrors in
the average hourly earnings series are not correlated with businessactivity,
this might create noise in my data, but should not biasmy results.
8. If labor market participation is selectively chosenduring the year, then
the coefficient on any annual measure of economic growth will bedownward
biased. The preZerred alternative is a measure of growth derivedonly during
the period the worker is in the labor market. To the extent thatI find
significant cyclical effects, they are minimum estimates of the true effect.
9. The small real annual change in wages reflects the overallstagnant macro-
economy during this time period. However, though real earnings growvery
little during these 14 years, there is significant cyclicalactivity. In 5 of
these years GNP growth is negative, in 5 years it exceeds5%, and in the
remaining 4 years it varies between 2.6% and 3.4%.
10. I choose to proxy the business cycle with changes in GNP. Thisis the
variable which is used to officially define cyclicalactivity in the economy.
I have duplicated all results reported here using changes inunemployment rates
rather than changes in GNP. In no case do the results differ.
2311. As noted above, this is at least partiallydue to the fact that I am using a
measure of average hourly earningsbased on annual income and hours. Those
excluded from the sample of workers in any given yearmust be non-labor market
participants over the entire year.
12. The wage equation estimated for each year usesln(wage) as the dependent
variable, and includes education, age, age squared, adummy variable for
unionization, and a constant.
13. I could regress individual wage changes against changesin GNP, rather than
using just the mean wage change. Thiswould mean using only individuals who
are employed in two consecutive years;it would also involve an enormous number
of observations over the 14 yeas. This would producethe same estimates as
reported here since OLS fits through the means.The standard errors of the two
techniques will differ. Under reasonable assumptions,the standard errors
reported here are larger than those whichwould be produced if all the micro-
data were utilized jointly. Further problems inthe standard errors arise from
the fact that the dependent variable itself is anestimate. While I could
adjust the variance/covariance matrixfor the standard deviations in the
estimated 13's for each year, I have no idea how tocalculate the covariance
between the estimates of 13 across the years. (Thefact that the estimated
regression is in first difference form onlyincreases these problems.) Not
adjusting for this should producesmaller standard errors than is accurate. A
priori I cannot tell which of these twoeffects would dominate. I have chosen
to report the uncorrected standard errors.
14. This technique is quite common in the empiricalliterature, thus I do not
repeat the econometric specificationin great detail. In brief, the selectivity
term is calculated as
f(5Zt)/(1 -F(6Zt))
where 6 is the vector of coefficients estimatedfrom a probit equation on labor
market participation. In my estimates, 6 includes education, age, agesquared,
number of dependents, and dummy variables indicatingmarital status and
residence in the northeast, northcentral or southern regionsof the country.
15. Although the estimation procedures differbetween the two papers, they both
should provide consistent estimates of wage cyclicality.Hoff itt, Keane and
Runkle follow the approach of other papers and measurecyclicality by including
a change in the unemployment rate intheir individual wage change regressions.
16. Like equation (4), this too can be written interms of the changes in the
13's and the changes in the X's. However, themathematical expression is long
and not at all revealing.
17. Heckman and Sedlacek as well as Hoff itt, Keaneand Runkle note differences
between the manufacturing and nonmanufacturing sector.I experimented with a
variety of different sectoral breakdowns.While the manufacturing distinction
was important, it was also clearthat white collar workers needed to be
differentiated from other workers.
18. One can reject the hypothesis that the three subgroupsare similar in their
wage equations at the 1%level of significance for both black and white workers
in each of the 14 years. (The mean coefficients overthe 14 years look more
similar than the estimated coefficients in any given year.)
2419. Of course, I would much prefer to use a variable whichmeasured actual years
of work experience. The PSID provides this only after 1973. SinceI need all
the time observations I can get, this leaves me withno choice but to use the
less accurate "age" variable in place of experience.
20. I report the results of this estimation only for white malesfor two
reasons: First, white men's wages show no evidence of being affectedby labor
force participation movements, as noted above, soignoring the participation
selectivity issue should not effect these results. (It would bevery difficult
to estimate a model in which both labor market participation andchoice between
three sectors occurs simultaneously.) Second, because of the smallnumber of
black men in the PSID sample, estimating sectoral choices andseparate wage
equations for each of the three sectors in a complex econometric modelcan be
difficult. This is particularly a problem for the PMAgroup of workers; in the
early years of the PSID, less than 50 black men are in thisgroup.
21. For a more detailed presentation and an empiricalexample of the use of
this type of a three-way choice model, see Blank [1985].
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Dependent Variable: Average BonnyEarnings ($81)
Mean LevelV 10.70 8.67 13.72
Avg. Annual Change .04 .09 -.02


















Independent Variables: Education (years)
Mean Level 12.66 10.70 14.67














Mean Level 40.16 39.89 40.31















Mean Level 1765.291743.43 1754.20


























5significant at 10% level.
1"Sectoral Groups: PMA =AllProfessional, Managerial and Administrative workers;
Mfg. =AllNon-PMA workers in manufacturing industries;
Non—Mfg. =AllNon-PMA workers in nonnanufacturing industries.
"Represents the mean(over14 years) of each annual mean variable.
Represents the coefficienta1 from the 13-observation regression (Xt1 -Xt)
+a1((GNP1
-
GNPt)/GNPt)÷ e ,where is the meaninyear tTable 2
MEAN LEVELS. VARIANCE AND CYCLICAL PATTERNS IN COEFFICIENTS
FROM OLS WAGE REGRESSIONS -1969—1982
SimpleOLS Selectivity Term
White Men Black Men White Men Black Men
Education
MeanCoefficient-" .0689 .0584 .0661 .0606
Mean Std Error!! .0039 .0044 .0038 .0046
Std Dev of CoeffIcients!" .0063 .0118 .0051 .0155
Cyclical Coefficient!'
-.0006 .0018* —.0005 .0020*
(.0006) (.0012) (.0005) (.0014)
Age
MeanCoefficient .0635 .0638 .0637 .0630
Mean Std Error .0032 .0035 .0032 .0036
Std Dev of Coefficients .0081 .0130 .0070 .0143
Cyclical Coefficient .0008* -.0013 .0006* -.0010
(.0004) (.0014) (.0003) (.0014)
Age Squared
Mean Coefficient -.0006 -.0006 -.0006 -.0006
Mean Std Error .00004 .00005 .00005 .00006
Std Dev of Coefficients .0001 .0002 .0001 .0002
Cyclical Coefficient
-.00001* .00002 .000008* .00001
(.000005) (.00002) (.000003) (.00002)
Union (1 =Union.ber)
MeanCoefficient .2667 .3416 .2496 .3322
Mean Std Error .0295 .0659 .0286 .0653
Std Dev of Coefficients .0342 .0801 .0315 .0720
Cyclical Coefficient
-.0018 .0038 -.0016 .0027
(.0022) (.0094) (.0022) (.0086)
Conatant
MeanCoefficient —.1810 —.2093 -.1569 -.2018
Mean Std Error .0327 .0403 .0328 .0402
Std Dev of Coefficients .0681 .0215 .0648 .0287
Cyclical Coefficient .0154* .0013 .0116* -.0005
(.0099) (.0027) (.0087) (.0040)
SelectivityCorrection
MeanCoefficient —.2686 .0290
Mean Std Error .1528 .1204




*Significant at 10% level.
!/'Represents the mean of 14 coefficient estimates (1969—1983).
!"Represents the mean of 14 coefficient standard errors (1969—1983).
!"Represents the standard deviation of the coefficients over the 14 years.





+ewhere is the estimated
coefficient in year tTable 3
MEAN LEVELS, VARIANCE, AND CYCLICAL PATTERNS IN COEFFICIENTS
FROM SECTORjL OLS WAGE REGRESSIONS'- 1969-1982






MeanCoefficjentV .0517 .0515 .0500 .0688 .0310 .0403
Mean Std Errorg/ .0073 .0071 .0064 .0169 .0091 .0058 Std 0ev of Coefficients1 .0077 .0149 .0105 .0227 .0183 .0196
Cyclical Coefficient4/ -.0007 .0022* —.0006 .0025 .0011 .0028
(.0008) (.0014) (.0016) (.0027) (.0030) (.0024)
Age
Mean Coefficient .0767 .0729 .0709 .0641 .0845 .0691 Mean Std Error .0060 .0052 .0050 .0153 .0067 .0044 Std Dev of Coefficients .0087 .0142 .0075 .0251 .0140 .0177
Cyclical Coefficient .0004 -.0002 .0019* .0005—.0013—.0029*
(.0005) (.0011) (.0011) (.0029) (.0023) (.0021)
Age Squared
Mean Coefficient -.0007-.0007-.0008 -.0006—.0009-.0007
Mean Std Error •oooi .0001 .0001 .0002 .0001 .0001
Std 0ev of Coefficients .oooi .0002 .0001 .0004 .0002 .0003
Cyclical Coefficient .000006 -.00001 -.00002 -.00003 .00002 .00005*
(.000007)(.00001) (.00002) (.00005) (.00003) (.00003)
Union (1 -Unioneaber)
Mean Coefficient .0531 .1862 .4545 .0436 .3187 .5132
Mean Std Error .0641 .0408 .0465 .3498 .0808 .0833
Std Dev of Coefficients .0292 .0595 .0490 .1608 .0710 .1104
Cyclical Coefficient .0007 .0058_.0098* .0049 .0095* -.0054
(.0037) (.0049) (.0050) (.0198) (.0058) (.0120)
Conatant
Mean Coefficient -.1231 —.1174—.1818 -.1029 —.2768—.1998
Mean Std Error .0568 .0525 .0490 .1388 .0564 .0478
Std Dev of Coefficients .0628 .0826 .0718 .0654 .0465 .0469
Cyclical Coefficient .0040_.0088* _.0058* -.0042 .0003 .0116
(.0031) (.0063) (.0043) (.0088) (.0062) (.0047)
*significant at 10% level.
Sectoral Groups: PMA =AllProfessional., Managerial and Administrative workers;
Mfg. =AllNon—PMA workers In manufacturing industries;
Non-Mfg. =AllNon—PMA workers In nonmanufacturing industries.
"Represents the mean of 14 coefficient estimates(1969—83).
3/—Representsthe mean of 14 coefficient standard errors (1969—1983).




GNPt)/GNPt)+e ,where is the estimated
coefficient in year tTable 4






PMA Pr(choose Mfg Pr(Choose PMA










MeanCoefficient .1727 -.0495 .2222 .0505 .0530 .0493
Mean Std Error .0202 .0256 .0425 .0287 .0143 .0196
Std Dev of Coefficients .0223 .0092 .0162 .0071 .0124 .0093
Cyclical Coefficient .0007 .0010 -.0003 —.0006 .0015* -.0007
(.0011) (.0008) (.0014) (.0007) (.0010) (.0014)
Age
Mean Coefficient -.0964 .0262 -.1226 .0774 .0717 .0715
Mean Std Error .0121 .0162 .0248 .0167 .0080 .0111
Std Dev of Coefficients .0163 .0117 .0081 .0083 .0012 .0065
Cyclical Coefficient
-.0006 -.0012* .0006 .0004 -.0001 .0O12
(.0008) (.0006) (.0009) (..0005) (.0007) (.0009)
Age Squared
Mean Coefficient .0012 -.0003 .0014 -.0007 -.0007 -.0008
Mean Std Error .0002 .0002 .0003 .0002 .0001 .0001
Std Dev of Coefficients .0002 .0002 .0001 .0001 .0002 .0001
Cyclical Coefficient .00001 .000014* -.00001 -.0001 -.000002 -.00001
(.00001) (.000009) (.00001) (.0001) (.000010) (.00001)
Region South
Mean Coefficient -.1655 —.2090 .0435
Mean Std Error .0814 .0844 .0878
Std Dev of Coefficients .0808 .0326 .0707
Cyclical Coefficient .0023 .0004 .0019
(.0057) (.0049) (.0056)
Region $est
Mean Coefficient —.0994 _.3393 .2399
Mean Std Error .1023 .0928 .1124
Std Dev of Coefficients .1150 .0480 .1006
Cyclical Coefficient -.0053 .0055 —.0108
(.0081) (.0064) (.0095)
Union
Mean CoefficIent .0524 .1840 .4386
Mean Std Error .0746 .0440 .0570





footnotes to Table 3 for sectoral definitions
"Coefficients in coluan (3) are calculatedfor the
See Appendix.
"See Appendix for definition of correlationcoefficients.
and further explanation of row categories.



























Mean Coefficient —.5905 — .3084
Mean Std Error .3376 .2979
.2820 —.1254
Std Dev of Coefficients .1084 .1007
.1184 .3084








Mean Coefficient -—- -——
Mean Std Error
.5321

























































A. MOVERS BETWEEN SECTORS1'
White Men -1969—1982
PMA- PMA- Mf g.- Mfg.+
Mfg. Nonmfg. PMA Nonmfg.
Nonnf g.- Nonmf g.-
PMA Mfg.
Mean Percent of Workers1"
Who Move per Year
.71 2.86 .94 2.14 3.51 2.06
Cyclica1ity Coefficient"
on Percent of Movers
—.0001 .0004 -.0005* .0002





.18 -.39 1.65 -.23






(.3545) (.1525) (.2922) (.0740)
.0664 .0076
(.1120) (.1100)
B. STAYERS WITHIN SECTORS
PMA Mfg. Nonafg.
Mean Percent of Workers!"
Who Stay for 2 Years
30.19 17.57 40.03
Cyclicality Coefuicient"

















*Sjgnificant at 10% level.
For definition of Sectoral groups, see Foonote 1, Table 3.
1/Represents mean.(over 13 two—year periods) of the percent of workers who move
from 1st to 2nd sector In these two years.





+e ,estimatedover 13 observations.
"Represents mean wage change over 13 two—year periods.







ESTIMATINGA JOINT SECTOR SELECTION/WAGE MODEL
Aworker is choosing one sector out of three (F, M, or N), each of which
have their own separate wage determination process. Let the utility available





Choice of one sector over another is based on a utility comparison between the
sectors, which leads to the three equations ((12) -(14)in the text):
(A2) UpN =U,
-

















It is straightforward to see that upM =UPN
-UN,63 =61
-2'and
=- • Thus,we need only estimate the determinants of the two com-
parisons upN and from which we can derive the determinants of the third
* choice,U PN









0r2CM F3K 0 aM
rlN r2N0 0 0 aNAppendix
where F3p =F1/42(1
-F12),F3M -F2EN/.T2(l -F12),r13= -
andr23 =--.1(1
-r12)/42Thus, jointly estimating a full sectoral choice/wage
model requires estimating three variances and five correlation coefficients.
The likelihood that worker i is observed in sector P, with wages Wp is
(A5) Lp =Pr(Cp =(Wp
-XI3p)/cp,iij > -Z1'3i>Z63)
Thiscan be written as the product of a univariate and a conditionalbivariate
distribution function:
(A5t) L1 =(Ep)I'( li' 2i
where is a univarity normal density function, and +'isa conditional
bivariate normal distribution. I' can be rewritten as a unconditional bivariate
normal distribution using straightforward statistical techniques, which
results in the likelihood
(A5'')Lpj =•(Ep)(Z61 + FpEp ,Z&3+F3ptp,F13-FpF3p)
4(1F1p)
Ina similar manner, the likelihood that individual i is paidinsector N is
(A6) LMi= I(-Z52 +F2ENCM ,Z&3-F3N€MF23 -
r(l-r3tM)
while the likelihood that individual i is paid in sector N is
(A7) "Ni = +( z&1 -F1cNN,Zs52-
F2ENtN, - rl€Nr2€N).
The overall likelihood function for an individual i is
(A8) L SpjLpj + +(l_Spi)(l_S)Lj
where Sp =1if individual i is in sector P, 0 otherwise; and SMi =1if
individual i is in sector M, 0 otherwise. The estimated likelihood function
for the entire sample of n individuals is
n
(A9) Z L.
i=1